State of Utah v. Michael Barrett : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
State of Utah v. Michael Barrett : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Shelden R. Carter; Attorney for Appellant.
Attorney General for Utah; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Barrett, No. 20050755 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6005
SHELDEN R CARTER (051 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 N. University Ave., SHIL 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocbuwer Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL BARRETT, 
Appellant/Defendant. 
—-oooOooo--
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPELLATE No.: 20050755 
IOOOOOOO— 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FUDM A CRIMINAL CONVICTION 
ENTERED IN THE FOIMITH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. THE 
HONORABLE CLAUDIiitiLAYCOCK, TRIAL JUDGE. 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELL/UfT 
SHELDEN R CARTER 
3325 NORTH UNIVERSITY 
SUITE 200 
PROVO, UTAH 84604 v 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR UTAH 
UTAH STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
Jamesto 
3325 N 
Phon 
jquare, Clocktower Bldg. 
ersity Avenue, Suite 200 
o, Utah 84604 
ber# 801-375-9801 
|ber# 801-377-1149 
SHELDEN K CARTER (I i' .<' i1)i 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower BIdg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS r 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOooo-
/ "•nnl1 laiiuii i, 
VS. 
MICHAEL BARRETT, 
Appt i id i i i /^ . . • 
•  ooo( )oo<> — 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTORY & CONSTITUTIONAL. . 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & 
STATUTES 
TABLE OF CASES. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMEN 
STATEMENT OF ISSUF 
STATEMENT OF CASE. . 
S T ^ T F M F N T O F R c l i : : v ' ^ " ' " "• 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPELLA11. No 2UUbU/b5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT 10 
CONCLUSION 23 
Addedum 25 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
Art. I Section 12. Utah State Constitution. 
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel... The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself... 
Fifth Amendment. United States Constitution. 
No person . . . nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself. 
Sixth Amendment. United States Constitution. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance 
of counsel for his defence. 
TABLE OF CASES 
AND AUTHORITIES 
Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) 14 
Cannadvv.Duqqer, 931 F.2d 752, 754 (11»h Cir. 1991) 16 
Cheatham v. State. 719 P.2d 612,618 (Wyo. 1986) 16 
Commonwealth v. Dustin, 373 Mass. 612,613-615 (1977), cert, denied, 
435 U.S. 943 (1978) 23 
Davis v. U.S.. 512 U.S. 452 (1994) 21 
Freeman v. State. 158 Md. App. 402,857 A.2d 557 (2004) 22 
Hampel v.State. 706 P.2d 1173,1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) 18,20 
Kver v. Carlton. 146 F.3d 374, 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1998) 16 
McDouoal v. State. 277 Ga. 493,591 S.E.2d 788 (2004) 22 
Missouri v.Seibert. 542 U.S. 600 (2004) 16 
2 
North Carolina v. Butler. 441 U.S. 369,373 (1979) 13 
People v. Quirk. 129 Cal.App.3d 618,181 Cal.Rptr. 301,308 (1982) 19 
People v.Russo. 148 Cal.App.3d 1172,196 Cal.Rptr. 466,468 (1983)...18 
Salt Lake City v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168,1171 (Utah 1983) 12 
Shedelbowser. V. Estelle. 885 F.2d 570,571 (9* Cir. 1989) 16 
State v. Dahlquist. 931 P.2d 862 (Utah App. 1997) 15,16 
State v.Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208, Utah 1987, (cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044)..14 
State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) 17,18,19,21 
State v. Levva. 906 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1995) 21,22 
State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993) 16,20,21 
State v. Marshall. 642 N.W.2d 48 (Minn.App. 2002) 17 
State v. Mirquet. 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996) 11 
State v. Moulds. 105 Idaho 880,673 P.2d 1074,1083 (Ct.App. 1983)...18 
State v. Sampson. 808 P.2s 1100 (Utah App. 1990) 13.17,19 
State v.Smith. 34 Wn. App. 405,661 P.2d 1001,1003 (1983) 18 
State v. Tuttle. 2002 SD 94,650 N.W.2d 20 22 
State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 440.443 (Utah 1986) 13 
State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993) 12 
Tauge v. Louisiana. 444 U.S. 469 (1980) 13 
Taylor v. State. 274 Ga. 269,553 S.E. 598 (Ga. 2001) 22 
United States v. Cherry. 733 F.2d 1124.1127 (5th Cir. 1984) 18 
United States v. Fouche. 776 F.2d 1398,1405 (9th Cir. 1985) 18 
United States v. Porter. 764 F.2d 1,6 (1st Cir. 1985) 19 
United States v. Prestigiacomo. 504 F. Supp. 681,683 (E.D.N Y 1981)...18 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, 
Section 12; Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) 
Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
3 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence. Defendant invoke his right to remain silent unequivocably. 
The officer fail to honor his right to remain silent and continued his 
interrogation. 
After advising the defendant of his Miranda rights, the defendant 
equivocably invoke his right to counsel but the officer continued to interrogate 
without first seeking to clarify whether the defendant wanted counsel present. 
The officer told the defendant that he would not use the statements 
given against him. Defendant seeks a suppression of the statements. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The defendant is charged with Possession of Pornography-
Exploitation of a Child. He entered a 'Sery Plea' preserving the right to appeal 
the motion to suppress. The State agreed via the 'Sery Plea' that the charge 
herein would not be sustained except through the introduction of the statement 
taken from the defendant. Defendant argues that it violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights and Art. I Section 12 of the Utah State Constittution. 
FACTUAL STATEMENT 
(The case is presented via the transcript of the initial contact with the 
officer and the subsequent interrogation. This Court should give the trial court 
no deference since the facts are presented in transcript form.) 
Officer Jackson, Spanish Fork Police, learned of a possible sexual 
relationship between a stepfather and stepdaughter, referred hereafter as E. 
The report was reported October 10,2004. E.'s friend reported it to her 
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parents and the parents then contacted Jackson. Officer Jackson contacted 
the stepdaughter and interviewed E. 
Jackson set up a pretext phone call with the defendant. Nothing of note 
was produced by this phone call. Officer Jackson the instructed E. to Mr. 
Barrett pick her up at the friend's home. As Barrett approached the friend's 
home, Jackson awaiting his arrival. As Barrett walked up the sidewalk, 
Jackson stopped him and informed him that he needed to speak with him. 
Preliminary Hearin (PR). Page 19 Line 25. P.H. page 41 Line 12. 
Jackson was identified himself as a police officer. P.H. Page 19 Line 
14. Back up officers had already been called. Suppression.Hearing (S.H). 
Page 22 Line 6. Page 43 Line 7/Interview Page 8 Line 209. 
Mr. Barrett was then placed into the officer's patrol car. This was an 
alternative to taking him to the police station. S.H. Page 1 Line 12. The officer 
advised the defendant he was under arrest at this time. P.H. Page 18. Line 25; 
Page 21 Line 3-14; Page 42 Line 19. 
Without any Miranda advisements being given, the officer commence 
an interrogation. Interview transcript Page 3 Line 73/76/78; Page 2 Line 
40/44; Page 5 Line 111; Page 6 Line 152/160; Page 7 Line 165. 
Without the advisement, Barrett then invoked his right to remain silent. 
To the officer's first questions, Mr. Barrett advised Jackson that he would 
"rather not say anything." Interview transcript Page 3 Line 74. Jackson 
continued despite Barrett's request. No effort was made by Jackson to clarify 
this advisement that Barrett did not want to speak with him. 
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The transcript of the initial arrest/detention is confirms 1) defendant 
had to stay with Jackson (Jackson tells defendant that he must understand 
that you are staying with me. You have to hang out with me). 2. Barrett could 
not leave. Someone had to come get his car.. He told Barrett someone else 
was going to have to pick up his truck. Interview Page 14 Line 361.3. Jackson 
advised Mr. Barrett that another officer was obtaining a search warrant to 
search the defendant's property. (See Interview Page 5 Line 134; Interview 
Page 6 Line 148. Page 7 Line 168; PR Page 1 Line 12). 
Jackson controlled the environment. When Barrett wanted to talk with 
his wife. Jackson advised:" Okay. I want you to understand you're gonna stay 
with me . . .". Interview Page 8 Line 202; Page 6 Line 148. Jackson 
restricted the time he could visit with his wife. Interview Page 14 Line 354. 
At the defendant's home, Jackson told Barrett's wife that Mr. Barrett 
will be taken to jail that night. Interview Page 12 Line 307. Jackson told Barrett 
to retrieve his property from his room. Interview Page 13 Line 335. Barrett 
was even monitored by the police using the restroom. Interview Page 13 Line 
344. At Line 341. Jackson states: "/ want you to understand you're under 
arrest, okay." 
Still no advisement per Miranda had been given. 
Defendant was thereafter transported to the police department. Barrett 
was then placed in an interview room. In the interview room, Jackson then 
finally advised him of his rights per Miranda. P.H. Page 21 Line 3-14; S.H. 
Page 23 Line 15. 
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In direct contradiction of the protections via the Miranda protections, 
Jackson stated that what he and Barrett discuss would stay between them. 
Interview Page 7 Line 177-178. Jackson is quoted as stating: 
"So I guess what I'm asking is, if things have happened, I'll keep 
it between us" 
After being advised of his Miranda rights, Barrett wanted to ask 
questions. The following dialogue took place: 
Officer: Having those rights in mind, I'd like to talk to you. Is that 
okay with you? 
Mr. Barrett: Yes. 
Officer: Okay 
M. BARRETT. Can I ask a question first? 
OFFICER. Sure. 
Defendant then reports he may want a lawyer but did not want to take 
any funds away from the family. It is reported: 
BARRETT. I'm guilty, off the record. I'm guilty, alright. Uh, I'm 
not gonna fight being guilty, but although I could afford an 
attorney, I'm not gonna take any money away from Deb, so I'm 
not gonna draw any, off of any resources of our household. So if I 
admit guilt, there will be no trial to establish my guilt, correct? 
Officer Jackson then starts to give legal advice. It continues: 
OFFICER. Kay. Here's how it works. You're, you' re concerned 
about a trial. Now I'm not gonna try to lead you down any path on 
what you should or shouldn't do. 
BARRETT. No, don't worry. I'm not. 
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Jackson then acknowledges that he may have crossed a line. He 
reports that he will not use what is stated against him: 
OFFICER. Cause I'm kind of walking a fine line. What happens is, is 
BARRETT. I'm not gonna use what you tell me against you. 
OFFICER. Just like I say to you. 
The officer then continues advising the defendant respecting criminal 
procedure: 
OFFICER. Urn, you have the choice whether to plead guilty or 
not guilty. That's up to you. That's your choice. 
Barrett. Correct. 
Officer. If you plead not guilty, is when the trial would happen. 
BARRETT. Right. 
OFFICER. If you plead guilty, there is no trial. 
BARRETT. To establish my guilt? 
OFFICER. Yeah. 
BARRETT. Correct. 
OFFICER. You 
BARRETT. And that's what I was trying to establish. 
OFFICER. Yeah. 
Barrett then attempting to clarify the consequences of speaking states: 
BARRETT. So anything that I, if you don't mind at least telling me 
the answer to this, anything I say to you could be used against 
me, but since I'm already admitting guilt. 
OFFICER. It would only be used in trial. 
Barrett. What could be used against me? I mean, I'm already. I'm 
not gonna go to trial.... 
Jackson then tells him that he may discredit E.'s statements. 
8 
OFFICER. Now when I go to file the charges and decide which 
codes have been violated, stuff like that, maybe she's off a little 
bit. May what she's saying happened, didn't happen, how many 
times it happened, maybe she's off a little bit. So I compare what 
you say as opposed to what she said and try to figure out where 
the best fit is. Let me tell you this, I don't wanna charge you with 
anything you haven't done. 
BARRETT. Well thank you. 
OFFICER. That should be common, I, you should expect that. 
BARRETT. That's ?? I'm glad you don't. 
OFFICER. But the reason I bring it up is, when she sits here. 
Barrett then questioning the officer states: 
Barrett. ?? trying to get in a fight with me, you're not gonna try 
and screw me over, right? 
OFFICER. No,no, Officer. ... 
Pursuant to the statement the defendant was charged with both the 
'rape of a child' and 'exploiting a minor'. Defendant seeks a suppression of 
reported statements. The statements are the sole basis of the conviction of the 
defendant for' rape of a child'. 
The subsequent search of his computer resulting from his statements 
disclosed the basis for the charge of 'exploiting a minor'. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant interrogated the defendant in a custodial setting. 
Immediately the defendant invoked his right to remain silent. The officer 
9 
ignored the defendant's right to remain silent and continued his custodial 
dialogue. After a considerable length of time, the officer finally advised the 
defendant of his Miranda rights. The defendant further invoked his right to 
remain silent in a more equivocal manner. He also equivocally invoked his 
right to counsel. The officer continued with the interrogation although he was 
constitutionally required to stop the interrogation. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION FOR PURPOSES OF MIRANDA 
Defendant contends for the purposes of Miranda that the defendant is 
'in custody' at the initial contact. In State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 
1996), a highway patrolman stopped a defendant for speeding. The trooper 
asked the accused to enter the officer's patrol car to observe the speed 
reading on the radar unit. In the car, the officer detected an order of burned 
marijuana and accused him of smoking marijuana. The trooper than 
instructed him to go get the marijuana or the officer would. Defendant 
retrieved the marijuana. The trooper then searched the defendant's car finding 
additional drugs and paraphernalia. The trial court suppressed evidence and 
the State appealed. 
The appellate Court held: 
The standard for determining when a defendant is "in custody" for Miranda 
purposes is well-settled. "[T]he safeguards prescribed by Miranda become 
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applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to 'degree 
associated with formal arrest'... More specifically, Miranda warnings 
are required whenever the circumstances of an interrogation are such that 
they "exert[] upon [the] detained person pressures that sufficiently impair 
his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
In State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed four (4) determining factors originally pronounced in Salt Lake City 
v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168,1171 (Utah 1983): 
(1) The site of interrogation; 
(2) Whether the investigation focused on the accused; 
(3) Whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and 
(4) The length and form of interrogation. 
Addressing these four determinative factors, defendant notes: 
(1) As Barrett walked up to the house, he was confronted by the 
officer and immediately taken to the patrol car. The officer noted this was an 
alternative to taking him to the police station. 
(2) The focus of the investigation was on the defendant exclusively. 
He was the only target. E. had identified him only. There was no one else to 
question. The investigation was limited to interviewing the defendant and 
obtaining his statement. Defendant denied the allegation. He advised the 
officer that he choose not to talk with him. 
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(3) The officer detained him further for the express purpose of arrest 
and continued interrogation. Barrett could not leave; the only way he was 
leaving was with Jackson. He could not communicate with his spouse or E. 
To even urinate, he was monitored. Both Jackson and Barrett knew he was 
under arrest in the police car. Barrett had no choice but to submit. 
(4) The interrogation/detention began in the officer's car and 
continued at his home and then at the police station. 
THE PRESUMPTION IS AGAINST THE WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS 
In North Carolina v. Butler. 441 U.S. 369,373 (1979) the Court held 
that "the courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights" .and 
noted that the "prosecution's burden is great" in overcoming this presumption. 
The defendant should be given the benefit of every reasonable presumption 
against waiver. See also State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440,443 (Utah 1986); 
In Tauqe v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980), the Court instructed: 
This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of 
constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and 
we re-assert these standards as applied to in-custody 
interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the 
isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place 
and has the only means of making available corroborated 
evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, 
the burden is rightly on its shoulders. 
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This is further confirmed by State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, Utah 
1987, (cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044,108 S. Ct.). 
INVOCATON OF RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
After being place in the police car, defendant invoked his right to remain 
silent— / would rather not say anything. The officer ignored this right and 
continued the custodial dialogue-- attempting to secure incriminating 
statements. 
Continued interrogation, after invocation of the right to counsel, was 
addressed by Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). There the defendant 
had invoked his right to counsel one day. The officer then terminated the 
interrogation. However, the next day, officers came again to him; stated that 
they wanted to talk with him and again informed him of his right. Defendant 
then waived his right to counsel and spoke with the officers. 
The Court found that once the right to counsel is invoked, it must be 
honored; no further questioning can occur. The Edwards Court held: 
An accused, such as petitioner, having expressed his desire to deai 
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the 
accused has himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or 
conversations with the police. 
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In State v. Dahlquist. 931 P.2d 862 (Utah App. 1997), faced the same 
issue presented in Edwards. There the defendant, prior to being advised of 
his Miranda warnings, told the officer that he would like an attorney present. 
The officer thereafter, as here, advised him of his Miranda rights. The 
defendant agreed to talk with a lawyer present. Instead of terminating the 
interrogation, the officer continued a dialogue. Dahlquist then questioned the 
officer about the purpose of the interrogation. The Court suppressed the 
statements finding a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court noted that 
the interrogation should have been stopped until counsel was present or he 
definitively waived his right to counsel. But as here, the officer continued his 
conversation with Dahlquist finally eliciting an incriminating response. The 
Court found that by continuing the custodial dialogue, the officer violated 
Dahlquist's Miranda rights and the statement should be suppressed. 
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT V. RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The Miranda right to remain silent and the right to counsel are 
indistinguishable. State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993).Once the 
defendant invokes his right to remain silent as the right to counsel, they must 
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be scrupulously honored. The officer cannot simply ignore the request. The 
interrogation must stop. The officer cannot continue a dialogue. Any police 
strategy or trickery not honoring the right to remain silent is unconstitutional. 
Missouri v. Seibert. 542 U.S. 600 (2004). See also comments in State v. 
Dahlquist. 931 P.2d 862 (Utah App. 1997) addressing such strategies. 
UNEQUOVICAL OR EOUOVICAL INVOCATION OF RIGHTS 
1 . UNAMBIGUOUS 
Defendant invoked his right to remain silent in unambiguous terms by 
stating that he would rather not say anything. Other Courts have held this 
language unambiguous. See Cannadv v. Duqqer, 931 F.2d 752,754 (11th Cir. 
1991) where the defendant sated that "I think I should call my lawyer"; Kver v. 
Carlton. 146 F.3d 374,376,379 (6th Cir. 1998) defendant stated "I'd just as 
soon have an attorney". See also Shedelbowser. V. Estelle. 885 F.2d 570, 
571 (9»h Cir. 1989). 
In State v. Marshall. 642 N.W.2d 48 (Minn.App. 2002), the Court 
found the statement, "No. I don't wish to say anything," constituted an 
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unambiguous invocation of the respondent's constitutional right to remain 
silent, requiring police to cease the interrogation. 
2. AMBIGUOUS INVOCATION 
Recognizing the presumptions against waiver, Courts recognize there 
may be an ambiguous invocation of the rights. In State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 
1100 (Utah App. 1990), the Court found the statement "Well, uh, should I have 
a lawyer" arguably invoked his right to counsel. The Court's logic was set out: 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court stated: "If [defendant] 
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he 
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no 
questioning." .. .Thus, a defendant's "request for counsel may be 
ambiguous or equivocal,".. and still qualify as an invocation of 
Miranda rights. 
The Court referred to a prior holding in State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988) where during the interrogation, the defendant stated: 
"This is a lie. I'm calling an attorney." The Griffin Court found this statement 
arguably invoked the right to counsel. 
The Griffin Court cited other jurisdictions finding similar statements to 
invoked the right to counsel. In United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124,1127 
(5th Cir. 1984) found "Maybe I should talk to an attorney before I make a 
further statement." to be an equivocal requests for counsel. In United States v. 
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Fouche. 776 F.2d 1398,1405 (9th Cir. 1985) I "might want to talk to a lawyer" 
was found equivocal as well. Others finding the statements an equivocal 
request were United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F. Supp. 681,683 (E.D.N Y 
1981) "maybe it would be good to have a lawyer"; Cheatham v. State, 719 
P.2d 612,618 (Wyo. 1986) (after being asked if he wanted to talk, defendant 
responded "Well I don't care, I'd like to see a lawyer, too you know"); Hampel 
v.State. 706 P.2d 1173,1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) ("I've got one question . . 
. [and the question is concerning a lawyer]... how would I be able to get one, 
a lawyer?"); People v.Russo, 148 Cal.App.3d 1172,196 Cal.Rptr. 466,468 
(1983) ("I don't know if I should have a lawyer here or what."); State v. Moulds, 
105 Idaho 880,673 P.2d 1074,1083 (Ct.App. 1983) ("Maybe I need an 
attorney"); State v. Smith, 34 Wn. App. 405,661 P.2d 1001,1003 (1983) ("Do 
you think I need an attorney?"). See also United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1,6 
(1st Cir. 1985) (unsuccessful call to attorney's office in presence of officer 
treated as equivocal request for counsel),cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1048,107 
S.Ct. 2178, 95 LEd.2d 835(1987); People v. Quirk, 129 Cal.App.3d 618,181 
Cal.Rptr. 301,308 (1982) (inquiry by defendant as to whether wife had hired an 
attorney treated as equivocal request for counsel). 
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The Sampson Court reaffirmed State v. Griffin's mandate—When an 
accused makes an arguably equivocal request for counsel during custodial 
interrogation, further questioning must be limited to clarifying the request. 
Any comment referencing the right to remain silent, the officer then 
should stop the questioning until he clarifies whether he chooses to invoke the 
right or not. 
After clearly invoking the right to remain silent initially, the officer 
continued with his interrogation. After finally advising him of his Miranda rights, 
the defendant stated: 
. . . but although I could afford an attorney, I'm not gonna take 
any money away from Deb, so I'm not gonna draw any, off of any 
resources of our household. So if I admit guilt, there will be no trial 
to establish my guilt, correct? 
The officer's interrogation should have stopped except to clarify. 
Defendant was avoiding a factual discussion with the officer. This has a similar 
tone to the interrogation occurring in Hampel v. State cited favorably by State 
v. Sampson. In Hampel, 706 P.2d 1173, the defendant stated "Urn, and the 
question is concerning a lawyer". The officer there explained the difficulty of 
getting a lawyer at that time of night and referred to it as a "whole lot of 
rigmarole". Hampel found the defendant arguably invoked his right to counsel 
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and the officer should have stopped. Jackson instead of clarifying gave the 
defendant a biased perspective of criminal procedure. 
The Utah Court found that the defendant's statement "I ain't got to 
listen to you, okay" and 'I ain't got to say nothin' invoked her right to remain 
silent. State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993). The Court applied 
the same standards to remain silent as with the right to an attorney. Miranda 
established identical standards for the invocation of either Miranda right. They 
found the U.S. Supreme Court required officers faced with an invocation of 
either right to terminate their questioning. 
Gutierrez applied the same clarification approach followed in 
Sampson. Two inquiries are required: (1) Whether an accused 'actually 
invoked' a Miranda right; and (2) If so, whether that request was scrupulously 
honored". As in Sampson , they elected to avoid officers making the 
determination of whether a particular statement met some threshold standard 
of clarity and favored allowing suspects to clarify their own remarks. See also 
Justice Souter's comment in Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452 (1994) finding it 
unrealistic to expect a suspect to speak with a discrimination of an 'Oxford 
don'. See also State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965,966-67 (Utah App. 1988). 
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In State v. Levva. 906 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1995), a trooper 
attempted to stop a motorist and the motorist attempted to evade the officer. 
The officer immediately handcuffed the driver and questioned him. After 
Miranda advisements, the trooper asked "Having these rights in mind do you 
wish to talk to us now?". The defendant answered "I don't know.". The trooper 
then responded, "You don't have to answer questions if you don't want to. It is 
up to you." The defendant then nodded his head affirmatively. Without further 
asked him, "So why did you run?". The defendant then confessed. 
The Court noted the officer's responsibility once any equivocal 
reference to a Miranda right is given. 
Upon an equivocal reference to Miranda rights, all questioning must 
cease except for those questions designed to clarify the defendant's 
equivocal statement. 
The Levva Court held: 
The State cannot establish a valid waiver when the defendant utters 
an equivocal reference which is arguably a request to invoke his 
Miranda rights, unless the state first clarifies the defendant's 
equivocal Miranda reference To allow police to continue 
interrogating the defendant and then use the "accused's subsequent 
responses to cast doubt on the adequacy of the initial request itself 
is... intolerable,"..., and "would clearly frustrate the purpose of 
Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine 
the will of the person being questioned." Under controlling Utah law, 
defendant's statement and conduct constituted an equivocal 
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invocation of his Miranda rights. Therefore, the trooper's questions 
should have been limited to only clarifying questions. 
This same analysis was adopted in Freeman v. State, 158 Md. App. 
402,857 A.2d 557 (2004). See also State v. Tuttle, 2002 SD 94,650 N.W.2d 
2Q;Tavlorv. State, 274 Ga. 269,553 S.E. 598 (Ga. 2Q01);McDouqalv.State, 
277 Ga. 493,591 S.E.2d 788 (2004). 
Instead of clarifying whether he wanted to discontinue the questioning 
or to have counsel appointed, the officer continued.. The officer even went so 
far as to suggest that he was going to work for the defendant in possibly 
minimizing the charges. 
OFFICER. Now when I go to file the charges and decide which codes 
have been violated, stuff like that, maybe she's off a little bit. Maybe 
what she's saying happened, didn't happen, how many times it 
happened, maybe she's off a little bit. So I compare what you say as 
opposed to what she said and try to figure out where the best fit is. Let 
me tell you this, I don't wanna charge you with anything you haven't 
done. 
The officer actually degrades the Miranda advisement by suggesting 
the officer would not try and screw him over. He further states "So I guess 
what I'm asking is, if things have happened, I'll keep it between us" 
This exchange is similar to the exchange in Commonwealth v. 
Dustin, 373 Mass. 612,613-615 (1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978). 
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There the defendant had been given the Miranda warnings twice one evening, 
indicated that he understood them and did not want to make a statement. He 
also consulted with two attorneys, both of whom advised him not to talk to the 
police. On the following day, while still in custody, the defendant asked an 
officer at the jail: "Mf I tell you something about the incident, will I be admitting 
my guilt?' The officer replied, 'You are not on the stand and you are not under 
oath. You can tell me anything you want to."1 
Jackson continues telling Barrett he will not try "screw" him over. And 
most curiously, the officer even suggests that the statements would not be 
used against him. 
BARRETT. I'm not gonna use what vou tell me against you. 
OFFICER. Just like I say to you. 
CONCLUSION 
When the defendant is placed in the patrol car he is in custody. Prior to 
any interrogation, Miranda mandates a proper advisement of his rights. 
Although no advisements were given, the defendant Immediately stated he 
would rather not speak to the office. The questioning should have stopped. It 
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was an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silence. All statements 
obtained after should be suppressed. 
After invoking the right initially, defendant again referenced the Miranda 
rights by stating that he could obtain a lawyer but did not to take money from 
the family. Defendant equivocally invoked his Miranda right to counsel. The 
officer again should have stop the questioning and asked him if he wanted to 
get an appointed lawyer or stop the interrogation. 
Instead of terminating the interrogation, the officer actually degraded 
the Miranda advisement by suggesting that he would not use any statements 
against him at trial. 
If the word attorney' or comrcieiitaboiJt 'remaining silent' is made, the 
officer should stop the interview. If the terminology used is equivocal, any 
further discussion should be to clarify only. If the terminology is unambiguous, 
the questioning should stop without further dialogue. 
Dated t h i s j j ^ day of January, 2006. 
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Addendum 
1. FIRST THREE PAGES OF INITIAL INTERVIEW 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower BIdg. 
3325 N. University Avenue, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Phone number # 801-375-9801 
JJ Detective John Jackson 
MB Michael Barrett 
DB Debbie Barrett 
/ JJ Lock that up. If you want, we can just talk in the jeep, we don't have to go back 
2 down to the police station. 
3 MB Okay. What's your name again? 
4 JJ John Jackson. I handled the ?? situation with Bubba. 
5 MB (Talking on cell phone - ??, okay. Okay. Okay, Alright, Detective Jackson's um 
6 wants to ask me some questions. He's down here. He knows all about this and he 
7 wants to talk to me for a minute. I don t know what's goin on, but uh. I, I said, I 
S don V know what this is all about, but he wants to talk to me about something. 
9 Kay. ?? ?? ?? ?? I don't know what's goin on. I'll call you later, okay. I don V 
10 have any idea honey. ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? I don 7 know what it is. I'll call you 
11 when I know, okay? ?? ) 
12 J J I appreciate you talkin to me so cooperative-like. 
13 MB Why wouldn't I? 
14 J J I'm just gonna pull up here and get out of the front of their house for a minute. 
15 MB I wondered what you were doin. I wondered why somebody was comin around 
16 the corner there. 
17 J J Some whacko parked in the jeep, huh? 
18 MB Well, I didn't know what was goin on. 1 thought geez. 
19 JJ Let's pull in this parking lot here for minute. Michael the reason I wanna talk to 
20 you, the reason I think it's so important that I talk to you right now is I've actually 
21 spent about the past two hours with Erica. 
22 MB Okay. 
23 JJ She's told me and told her friend, told her friend's parents about your and her 
24 relationship and some things that have gone on that she feels aren't right and she 
25 wanted me to talk to you about. Uh, it's only fair, I mean, I've spent the last M Barrett Interview. October 10. 2004 Pg J 
couple of hours with her. She's kind of on a break down right now. She's not 
with it. She's kind of struggled a little bit. I wanted to talk to you and kind of get 
your version of you guy's relationship and kind of see maybe where these things 
are comin from. Understanding, I know, I'm fiill aware that these kids haven't 
had an easy path. I understand that, with their real dad and Phillip and his 
situation with his older sister 
MB Mm-hmm. 
JJ I understand that. 
MB Mm-hmm. 
J J Uh, but I'm gonna be flat out blunt with ya, Erica's disclosed that there's been a 
relationship between you and her that hasn't always been down the straight and 
narrow. Now, what I wanna do, hopefully, is keep this low-key. I don't like these 
public investigations and stuff like that. 
MB Mm-hmm. 
JJ So that's why I asked you to come talk to me tonight, maybe get your side of you 
guy's relationship. I don't know what your wife told you about Phillip's case. I 
never really talked to you, I talked to her more than anybody, but 
MB Mm-hmm. 
J J I'd just as soon get the facts and get em out and get it done. So, uh do you know 
what Erica, do you guys get along real well? 
MB Who? 
JJ You and Erica? 
MB Well, yeah, like anybody, any stepdaughter and her ??, any stepfather and her 
daughter, you know. 
JJ She's actually surprised me when I asked her how her relationship with you was. 
She, she thought pretty high of ya. Well, I shouldn't say thought, thinks pretty 
high of you. 
MB Yeah, she, she considers me her dad. 
JJ Yeah, she, I noticed that she calls you dad 
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55 MB Yeah, she does. 
56 JJ And father and 
57 MB Yeah. 
58 JJ But you 
59 MB Well she calls me dad, yeah. 
60 JJ Help her with school, help her with things, you know, raisin a teenage daughter's 
61 not easy, I know. 
62 MB Yeah, I've always helped her with school, with her school work. 
63 JJ So she talked real high of ya. What she's disclosed to me tliough is a relationship 
64 between you guys that's turned sexual and whether those things are natural, 
65 whether they've, I don't know. 
66 MB ?? I don't know what she said, but 
67 J J Well, ?? ?? ?? is to go through this whole investigation I just put her in front of a 
68 videoed recorded interview. 
69 MB Mm-hmm. 
70 JJ And she bawled for a couple hours about some things you guys do at the 
71 warehouse, at your house. And uh she had a pretty rough time with it. I have no 
72 reason to doubt her, but yet, I really can't make any decisions until I talk to you, 
73 so I was hopin you'd kind of give me your version of those relationships. 
74 MB I don't know what she said. I, Fd rather not say anything. There's, there s no 
75 relationship between us, other than the daddy-daughter thing. I mean, we 
76 JJ She basically said you guys have sex. 
77 MB She's, she's blowin it out of proportion. That's not true. 
78 J J Okay. What's she blowin up? 
79 MB Well, I don't know what she said. I don't, I'm, I'm not sure what she said. I'm, 
80 Fm, I wanna cooperate with ya 
81 JJ She said M Barrett Interview. October 10. 2004 Pg 3 
